Autodefesa da República da Polônia

Autodefesa da República da Polónia

*Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej*
Autodefesa da República da Polónia Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej
Líder	Lech Kuropatwiński
Fundador	Andrzej Lepper
Fundação	1992
Sede	Varsóvia, Polónia
Ideologia	Populismo ; Agrarianismo ; Socialismo ; Estatismo ; Nacionalismo de esquerda ; Conservadorismo social ; Conservadorismo religioso ; Eurocepticismo
Espectro político	Extrema-esquerda
Cores	Amarelo

A Autodefesa da República da Polônia ^{(português brasileiro)} ou Polónia ^{(português europeu)} (em polaco: Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej). SRP, é um partido político e uma central sindical da Polônia. A Autodefesa combinava políticas económicas populistas e estatistas com um conservadorismo religioso católico e um marcado eurocepticismo e foi incluído no espectro político de extrema-esquerda.^[1]

Resultados eleitorais

Eleições legislativas

Sejm

Data	Votos	%	Deputados	+/-	Status
1991	3 247	0,0 (#29)	0 / 460		N/D
1993	383 967	2,8 (#11)	0 / 460	=	N/D
1997	10 073	0,1 (#14)	0 / 460	=	N/D
2001	1 327 624	10,2 (#3)	53 / 460	53	Apoio parlamentar
2005	1 347 355	11,4 (#3)	56 / 460	3	Governo
2007	247 335	1,5 (#5)	0 / 460	56	N/D
2011	9 733	0,1 (#11)	0 / 460	=	N/D

Senado

Data	Deputados	+/-	Status
1991	0 / 100		N/D
1993	0 / 100	=	N/D
1997	0 / 100	=	N/D
2001	2 / 100	2	Apoio parlamentar
2005	3 / 100	1	Governo
2007	0 / 100	3	N/D
2011	0 / 100	=	N/D

Eleições presidenciais

Data	Candidato apoiado	1ª Volta		2ª Volta
Data	Candidato apoiado	Votos	%	Votos	%
1995	Andrzej Lepper	235 797	1,3 (#9)
2000	Andrzej Lepper	537 570	3,1 (#5)
2005	Andrzej Lepper	2 259 094	15,1 (#3)
2010	Andrzej Lepper	214 657	1,3 (#7)
2015	Não concorreu

Eleições europeias

Data	Votos	%	Deputados	+/-
2004	656 782	10,8 (#4)	6 / 54
2009	107 185	1,5 (#7)	0 / 50	6
2014	2 729	0,0 (#12)	0 / 51	=

Referências

↑ ^a ^b
- Soule, Véronique (23 de Outubro de 2005). «Gdansk o Berço do Solidariedade, Ancora-se à Direita». Público. Gdansk. Gdansk, onde a social-democracia e ainda mais a extrema-esquerda populista da Samoobrona (Autodefesa) obtiveram resultados bem inferiores à média nacional, foi sempre um grande bastião do anticomunismo.
- María Guadalupe Jimena Castro López (2008). Lorena Ruano Gómez, ed. El apoyo a la Unión Europea en Hungría y Polonia tras su adhesión (PDF) (Tese de Título de Licenciada en Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales). Cidade do México: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas. p. 49. Autodefensa de la República de Polonia (Samoobrona RP): extrema izquierda, socialista, populista, católico, socialista. (economía), aislacionista y nacionalista.
- Paul G. Lewis; Zdenka Mansfeldová (2007). «12.3 The role of the European issue». The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. [S.l.]: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 242. ISBN 9780230596658. doi:10.1057/9780230596658. In the largest group of countries (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and, more recently, Estonia) Eurosceptic parties appear on both the right-wing nationalist (SNS, MIÉP, Ataka, LPR, to some extent ODS) and radical left (KSČM, Hungarian Labour Party, Association of Workers of Slovakia, Communist Party of Slovakia, Self-Defence) ends of the party spectrum.
- Andrzej Antoszewski (2005). Partie polityczne Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej (em polaco). Poznań-Wrocław: Wyższa Szkoła Zarządzania i Bankowości w Poznaniu. p. 180. ISBN 83-88544-63-2. Jedyne ugrupowanie ekstremalnej lewicy, które nie jest formacją neokomunistyczną, to polska Samoobrona. W wielu momentach jej program gospodarczy, akcentujący głównie konieczność powstrzymania prywatyzacji oraz ochronę narodowych interesów, jest zbieżny z postulatami partii neokomunistycznych.
- Ryszard Herbut; Andrzej Antoszewski (2007). Systemy polityczne współczesnej Europy (em polaco). [S.l.]: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. p. 102. ISBN 978-83-011-4622-1. W niektórych elekcjach wzięły udział także inne partie, które mogą być określone mianem skrajnej lewicy. Mamy tu na myśli Związek Robotników Słowacji (ZRS), ukraińską Progresywną Partię Socjalistyczną (SPS) oraz polską Samoobronę.
- Krzysztof Jasiewicz; Agnieszka Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz (2007). «Poland». European Consortium for Political Research. European Journal of Political Research. 46 (6–7): 1069. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00752.x. In its public statements, Self-Defense has been critical (often harshly) of the legacies of both communism and Solidarity, yet among its leaders there are several individuals formerly associated with the communist regime. Its support for state interventionism and opposition to market mechanisms place it on the political far left.
- Madalena Pontes Meyer Resende (2004). An Ethos Theory of Party Positions on European Integration: Poland and Beyond (PDF). [S.l.]: ProQuest LLC. p. 159. However, an analysis of the evolution of the last years makes it apparent that the party identity is mainly based on a radical conception of economic class and is constituted by those heavily disadvantaged by the transition. The Samoobrona can therefore be classified as an extreme-left party.
- Agata Górny; Aleksandra Grzymała-Kazłowska; Piotr Koryś; Agnieszka Weinar (2003). «Multiple citizenship in Poland» (PDF). Institute for Social Studies Warsaw University. Prace Migracyjne. 53 (1): 45. We did not consider the populist far-left (Samoobrona) and the nationalistic far right wing (LPR) nor the Polish Peasants’ Party: PSL. There were many reasons for such a decision. None of the two extreme parties had representatives in the parliament of the 3rd term, when the debate over citizenship reached its peak.
- Kovalov, Maksym (2013). «The Effects of Populism on Democratic Quality in the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine» (PDF). Norman, Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma. OU - Dissertations (9437): 57. The radical left parties represent traditional agrarian populism, such as Self Defense (Samoobrona) in Poland.
- Manó Gábor Tóth (2008). «Carrot and Stick: The Prospect of EU Membership as a Motive in States in Transition» (PDF). Skopje: Analytica. Interns Yearbook: 66. The right-wing Law and Justice Party formed a minority government in Poland after the 2005 elections, and formed a majority government next year in coalition with the provincial far-left Self Defence Party and the xenophobic far-right League of Polish Families, having the Kaczyński twin brothers as president and prime minister.
- Vladimír Naxera; Viktor Glied; Ondřej Filipec; Małgorzata Kaczorowska (2020). «"To protect national sovereignty from the EU?" The 2019 EP elections and populist parties in V4 countries» (PDF). UNISCI Journal. 54 (1): 76. ISSN 2386-9453. doi:10.31439/unisci-98. These include, first and foremost, extreme-left Self-Defense (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SO, Self-Defense) and the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR).
- Derrick M. Nault; Bei Dawei; Evangelos Voulgarakis; Rab Paterson; Cesar Andres-Miguel Suva (2013). Experiencing Globalization: Religion in Contemporary Contexts. [S.l.]: Anthem Press. p. 143. ISBN 978-0857285591. It is important to note that the PiS grew increasingly populist after 2005, when the party entered into a coalition with the LPR and the populist extreme-left Self-Defense.
- Marsh, Michael; Mikhaylov, Slava; Schmitt, Hermann (2007). European Elections after Eastern Enlargement: Preliminary Results from the European Election Study 2004. Col: CONNEX Report Series No 01. Mannheim: Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES). p. 244. ISSN 1864-1539. The 2001 election was the first that Samoobrona, now Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (SRP), contested as a party. It can be labeled as a radical populist-left party, as it predominantly concentrates on economic and socio-economic issues.
- Kubas, Sebastian (2014). Marek Barański; Jerzy Wiśniewski, eds. «Kształtowanie się kategorii rodzin partyjnych w Czechach, Polsce, Słowacji i na Węgrzech w perspektywie 25 lat demokratyzacji». Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego. 25 lat transformacji w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej: 91. ISBN 978-83-8012-371-7. W Polsce w omawianym okresie lewicowym ugrupowaniem radykalnym była Samoobrona. Partia opierała swoją działalność na promowaniu wizerunku charyzmatycznego lidera Andrzeja Leppera.
- Musiałowska, Ewa (2008). «Political Reporting in Poland: What Has Changed over The Last Decade?» (PDF). Communicating for Social Impact. 58th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA). Montreal, Quebec: International Communication Association. p. 4. Self-Defense is a radical left-wing grouping that emerged on the wave of distrust to Polish political elites.
- Kristina Mikulova (2012). "Missionary Zeal of Recent Converts": Norms and Norm Entrepreneurs in the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia 1989-2011 (PDF). [S.l.]: University of Oxford. pp. 229–230. Apart from the relatively rare individual cases in the mainstream, opposition to the Polish forces’ participation in the Iraq War mainly rested with parties on the fringes of the political spectrum: the far-right League of Polish Families (LPR) and far-left Self-Defense (Samooborona) [sic].
- Rekawek, Kacper; Renard, Thomas; Molas, Bàrbara (2024). Russia and the Far-Right: Insights from Ten European Countries (PDF). The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) Press. p. 316. ISBN 9789083419916. ISSN 2468-0486. doi:10.19165/2024.1563. Together with Mateusz Piskorski, a longtime stalwart of the pro-Russia scene in Poland, and a former parliamentarian with the far-left and populist Samoobrona (Self-Defence) party, they also ran the YouTube channel Die Guten Menschen! until 2021, the recordings of which were repeatedly shared by Dugin on his now-defunct Facebook fan page.
- Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser; Paul Taggart; Paulina Ochoa Espejo; Pierre Ostiguy (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Col: Oxford Handbooks. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press. p. 193. ISBN 9780192525376. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001. On the radical left, Poland’s Self Defence (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SRP) party exploited rising public discontent with the politics and politicians of transition to enter parliament as the third largest party in 2001.
- Eckhard Jesse; Tom Thieme (2011). Extremismus in den EU-Staaten (em alemão) 1 ed. [S.l.]: VS Verlag. p. 450. ISBN 978-3-531-17065-7. Zehn linksextremistische Parteien zogen von 1994 an ins Europaparlament ein, von denen die meisten – mit Ausnahme der polnischen Samoobrona – in ihren Wahlergebnissen relativ stabil blieben.

[esquerda-1] 
Soule, Véronique (23 de Outubro de 2005). «Gdansk o Berço do Solidariedade, Ancora-se à Direita». Público. Gdansk. Gdansk, onde a social-democracia e ainda mais a extrema-esquerda populista da Samoobrona (Autodefesa) obtiveram resultados bem inferiores à média nacional, foi sempre um grande bastião do anticomunismo.
María Guadalupe Jimena Castro López (2008). Lorena Ruano Gómez, ed. El apoyo a la Unión Europea en Hungría y Polonia tras su adhesión (PDF) (Tese de Título de Licenciada en Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales). Cidade do México: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas. p. 49. Autodefensa de la República de Polonia (Samoobrona RP): extrema izquierda, socialista, populista, católico, socialista. (economía), aislacionista y nacionalista.
Paul G. Lewis; Zdenka Mansfeldová (2007). «12.3 The role of the European issue». The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. [S.l.]: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 242. ISBN 9780230596658. doi:10.1057/9780230596658. In the largest group of countries (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and, more recently, Estonia) Eurosceptic parties appear on both the right-wing nationalist (SNS, MIÉP, Ataka, LPR, to some extent ODS) and radical left (KSČM, Hungarian Labour Party, Association of Workers of Slovakia, Communist Party of Slovakia, Self-Defence) ends of the party spectrum.
Andrzej Antoszewski (2005). Partie polityczne Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej (em polaco). Poznań-Wrocław: Wyższa Szkoła Zarządzania i Bankowości w Poznaniu. p. 180. ISBN 83-88544-63-2. Jedyne ugrupowanie ekstremalnej lewicy, które nie jest formacją neokomunistyczną, to polska Samoobrona. W wielu momentach jej program gospodarczy, akcentujący głównie konieczność powstrzymania prywatyzacji oraz ochronę narodowych interesów, jest zbieżny z postulatami partii neokomunistycznych.
Ryszard Herbut; Andrzej Antoszewski (2007). Systemy polityczne współczesnej Europy (em polaco). [S.l.]: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. p. 102. ISBN 978-83-011-4622-1. W niektórych elekcjach wzięły udział także inne partie, które mogą być określone mianem skrajnej lewicy. Mamy tu na myśli Związek Robotników Słowacji (ZRS), ukraińską Progresywną Partię Socjalistyczną (SPS) oraz polską Samoobronę.
Krzysztof Jasiewicz; Agnieszka Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz (2007). «Poland». European Consortium for Political Research. European Journal of Political Research. 46 (6–7): 1069. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00752.x. In its public statements, Self-Defense has been critical (often harshly) of the legacies of both communism and Solidarity, yet among its leaders there are several individuals formerly associated with the communist regime. Its support for state interventionism and opposition to market mechanisms place it on the political far left.
Madalena Pontes Meyer Resende (2004). An Ethos Theory of Party Positions on European Integration: Poland and Beyond (PDF). [S.l.]: ProQuest LLC. p. 159. However, an analysis of the evolution of the last years makes it apparent that the party identity is mainly based on a radical conception of economic class and is constituted by those heavily disadvantaged by the transition. The Samoobrona can therefore be classified as an extreme-left party.
Agata Górny; Aleksandra Grzymała-Kazłowska; Piotr Koryś; Agnieszka Weinar (2003). «Multiple citizenship in Poland» (PDF). Institute for Social Studies Warsaw University. Prace Migracyjne. 53 (1): 45. We did not consider the populist far-left (Samoobrona) and the nationalistic far right wing (LPR) nor the Polish Peasants’ Party: PSL. There were many reasons for such a decision. None of the two extreme parties had representatives in the parliament of the 3rd term, when the debate over citizenship reached its peak.
Kovalov, Maksym (2013). «The Effects of Populism on Democratic Quality in the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine» (PDF). Norman, Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma. OU - Dissertations (9437): 57. The radical left parties represent traditional agrarian populism, such as Self Defense (Samoobrona) in Poland.
Manó Gábor Tóth (2008). «Carrot and Stick: The Prospect of EU Membership as a Motive in States in Transition» (PDF). Skopje: Analytica. Interns Yearbook: 66. The right-wing Law and Justice Party formed a minority government in Poland after the 2005 elections, and formed a majority government next year in coalition with the provincial far-left Self Defence Party and the xenophobic far-right League of Polish Families, having the Kaczyński twin brothers as president and prime minister.
Vladimír Naxera; Viktor Glied; Ondřej Filipec; Małgorzata Kaczorowska (2020). «"To protect national sovereignty from the EU?" The 2019 EP elections and populist parties in V4 countries» (PDF). UNISCI Journal. 54 (1): 76. ISSN 2386-9453. doi:10.31439/unisci-98. These include, first and foremost, extreme-left Self-Defense (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SO, Self-Defense) and the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR).
Derrick M. Nault; Bei Dawei; Evangelos Voulgarakis; Rab Paterson; Cesar Andres-Miguel Suva (2013). Experiencing Globalization: Religion in Contemporary Contexts. [S.l.]: Anthem Press. p. 143. ISBN 978-0857285591. It is important to note that the PiS grew increasingly populist after 2005, when the party entered into a coalition with the LPR and the populist extreme-left Self-Defense.
Marsh, Michael; Mikhaylov, Slava; Schmitt, Hermann (2007). European Elections after Eastern Enlargement: Preliminary Results from the European Election Study 2004. Col: CONNEX Report Series No 01. Mannheim: Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES). p. 244. ISSN 1864-1539. The 2001 election was the first that Samoobrona, now Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (SRP), contested as a party. It can be labeled as a radical populist-left party, as it predominantly concentrates on economic and socio-economic issues.
Kubas, Sebastian (2014). Marek Barański; Jerzy Wiśniewski, eds. «Kształtowanie się kategorii rodzin partyjnych w Czechach, Polsce, Słowacji i na Węgrzech w perspektywie 25 lat demokratyzacji». Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego. 25 lat transformacji w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej: 91. ISBN 978-83-8012-371-7. W Polsce w omawianym okresie lewicowym ugrupowaniem radykalnym była Samoobrona. Partia opierała swoją działalność na promowaniu wizerunku charyzmatycznego lidera Andrzeja Leppera.
Musiałowska, Ewa (2008). «Political Reporting in Poland: What Has Changed over The Last Decade?» (PDF). Communicating for Social Impact. 58th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA). Montreal, Quebec: International Communication Association. p. 4. Self-Defense is a radical left-wing grouping that emerged on the wave of distrust to Polish political elites.
Kristina Mikulova (2012). "Missionary Zeal of Recent Converts": Norms and Norm Entrepreneurs in the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia 1989-2011 (PDF). [S.l.]: University of Oxford. pp. 229–230. Apart from the relatively rare individual cases in the mainstream, opposition to the Polish forces’ participation in the Iraq War mainly rested with parties on the fringes of the political spectrum: the far-right League of Polish Families (LPR) and far-left Self-Defense (Samooborona) [sic].
Rekawek, Kacper; Renard, Thomas; Molas, Bàrbara (2024). Russia and the Far-Right: Insights from Ten European Countries (PDF). The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) Press. p. 316. ISBN 9789083419916. ISSN 2468-0486. doi:10.19165/2024.1563. Together with Mateusz Piskorski, a longtime stalwart of the pro-Russia scene in Poland, and a former parliamentarian with the far-left and populist Samoobrona (Self-Defence) party, they also ran the YouTube channel Die Guten Menschen! until 2021, the recordings of which were repeatedly shared by Dugin on his now-defunct Facebook fan page.
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser; Paul Taggart; Paulina Ochoa Espejo; Pierre Ostiguy (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Col: Oxford Handbooks. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press. p. 193. ISBN 9780192525376. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001. On the radical left, Poland’s Self Defence (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SRP) party exploited rising public discontent with the politics and politicians of transition to enter parliament as the third largest party in 2001.
Eckhard Jesse; Tom Thieme (2011). Extremismus in den EU-Staaten (em alemão) 1 ed. [S.l.]: VS Verlag. p. 450. ISBN 978-3-531-17065-7. Zehn linksextremistische Parteien zogen von 1994 an ins Europaparlament ein, von denen die meisten – mit Ausnahme der polnischen Samoobrona – in ihren Wahlergebnissen relativ stabil blieben.

[2] Soule, Véronique (23 de Outubro de 2005). «Gdansk o Berço do Solidariedade, Ancora-se à Direita». Público. Gdansk. Gdansk, onde a social-democracia e ainda mais a extrema-esquerda populista da Samoobrona (Autodefesa) obtiveram resultados bem inferiores à média nacional, foi sempre um grande bastião do anticomunismo.

[3] María Guadalupe Jimena Castro López (2008). Lorena Ruano Gómez, ed. El apoyo a la Unión Europea en Hungría y Polonia tras su adhesión (PDF) (Tese de Título de Licenciada en Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales). Cidade do México: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas. p. 49. Autodefensa de la República de Polonia (Samoobrona RP): extrema izquierda, socialista, populista, católico, socialista. (economía), aislacionista y nacionalista.

[4] Paul G. Lewis; Zdenka Mansfeldová (2007). «12.3 The role of the European issue». The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. [S.l.]: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 242. ISBN 9780230596658. doi:10.1057/9780230596658. In the largest group of countries (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and, more recently, Estonia) Eurosceptic parties appear on both the right-wing nationalist (SNS, MIÉP, Ataka, LPR, to some extent ODS) and radical left (KSČM, Hungarian Labour Party, Association of Workers of Slovakia, Communist Party of Slovakia, Self-Defence) ends of the party spectrum.

[5] Andrzej Antoszewski (2005). Partie polityczne Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej (em polaco). Poznań-Wrocław: Wyższa Szkoła Zarządzania i Bankowości w Poznaniu. p. 180. ISBN 83-88544-63-2. Jedyne ugrupowanie ekstremalnej lewicy, które nie jest formacją neokomunistyczną, to polska Samoobrona. W wielu momentach jej program gospodarczy, akcentujący głównie konieczność powstrzymania prywatyzacji oraz ochronę narodowych interesów, jest zbieżny z postulatami partii neokomunistycznych.

[6] Ryszard Herbut; Andrzej Antoszewski (2007). Systemy polityczne współczesnej Europy (em polaco). [S.l.]: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. p. 102. ISBN 978-83-011-4622-1. W niektórych elekcjach wzięły udział także inne partie, które mogą być określone mianem skrajnej lewicy. Mamy tu na myśli Związek Robotników Słowacji (ZRS), ukraińską Progresywną Partię Socjalistyczną (SPS) oraz polską Samoobronę.

[7] Krzysztof Jasiewicz; Agnieszka Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz (2007). «Poland». European Consortium for Political Research. European Journal of Political Research. 46 (6–7): 1069. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00752.x. In its public statements, Self-Defense has been critical (often harshly) of the legacies of both communism and Solidarity, yet among its leaders there are several individuals formerly associated with the communist regime. Its support for state interventionism and opposition to market mechanisms place it on the political far left.

[8] Madalena Pontes Meyer Resende (2004). An Ethos Theory of Party Positions on European Integration: Poland and Beyond (PDF). [S.l.]: ProQuest LLC. p. 159. However, an analysis of the evolution of the last years makes it apparent that the party identity is mainly based on a radical conception of economic class and is constituted by those heavily disadvantaged by the transition. The Samoobrona can therefore be classified as an extreme-left party.

[9] Agata Górny; Aleksandra Grzymała-Kazłowska; Piotr Koryś; Agnieszka Weinar (2003). «Multiple citizenship in Poland» (PDF). Institute for Social Studies Warsaw University. Prace Migracyjne. 53 (1): 45. We did not consider the populist far-left (Samoobrona) and the nationalistic far right wing (LPR) nor the Polish Peasants’ Party: PSL. There were many reasons for such a decision. None of the two extreme parties had representatives in the parliament of the 3rd term, when the debate over citizenship reached its peak.

[10] Kovalov, Maksym (2013). «The Effects of Populism on Democratic Quality in the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine» (PDF). Norman, Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma. OU - Dissertations (9437): 57. The radical left parties represent traditional agrarian populism, such as Self Defense (Samoobrona) in Poland.

[11] Manó Gábor Tóth (2008). «Carrot and Stick: The Prospect of EU Membership as a Motive in States in Transition» (PDF). Skopje: Analytica. Interns Yearbook: 66. The right-wing Law and Justice Party formed a minority government in Poland after the 2005 elections, and formed a majority government next year in coalition with the provincial far-left Self Defence Party and the xenophobic far-right League of Polish Families, having the Kaczyński twin brothers as president and prime minister.

[12] Vladimír Naxera; Viktor Glied; Ondřej Filipec; Małgorzata Kaczorowska (2020). «"To protect national sovereignty from the EU?" The 2019 EP elections and populist parties in V4 countries» (PDF). UNISCI Journal. 54 (1): 76. ISSN 2386-9453. doi:10.31439/unisci-98. These include, first and foremost, extreme-left Self-Defense (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SO, Self-Defense) and the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR).

[13] Derrick M. Nault; Bei Dawei; Evangelos Voulgarakis; Rab Paterson; Cesar Andres-Miguel Suva (2013). Experiencing Globalization: Religion in Contemporary Contexts. [S.l.]: Anthem Press. p. 143. ISBN 978-0857285591. It is important to note that the PiS grew increasingly populist after 2005, when the party entered into a coalition with the LPR and the populist extreme-left Self-Defense.

[14] Marsh, Michael; Mikhaylov, Slava; Schmitt, Hermann (2007). European Elections after Eastern Enlargement: Preliminary Results from the European Election Study 2004. Col: CONNEX Report Series No 01. Mannheim: Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES). p. 244. ISSN 1864-1539. The 2001 election was the first that Samoobrona, now Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (SRP), contested as a party. It can be labeled as a radical populist-left party, as it predominantly concentrates on economic and socio-economic issues.

[15] Kubas, Sebastian (2014). Marek Barański; Jerzy Wiśniewski, eds. «Kształtowanie się kategorii rodzin partyjnych w Czechach, Polsce, Słowacji i na Węgrzech w perspektywie 25 lat demokratyzacji». Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego. 25 lat transformacji w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej: 91. ISBN 978-83-8012-371-7. W Polsce w omawianym okresie lewicowym ugrupowaniem radykalnym była Samoobrona. Partia opierała swoją działalność na promowaniu wizerunku charyzmatycznego lidera Andrzeja Leppera.

[16] Musiałowska, Ewa (2008). «Political Reporting in Poland: What Has Changed over The Last Decade?» (PDF). Communicating for Social Impact. 58th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA). Montreal, Quebec: International Communication Association. p. 4. Self-Defense is a radical left-wing grouping that emerged on the wave of distrust to Polish political elites.

[17] Kristina Mikulova (2012). "Missionary Zeal of Recent Converts": Norms and Norm Entrepreneurs in the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia 1989-2011 (PDF). [S.l.]: University of Oxford. pp. 229–230. Apart from the relatively rare individual cases in the mainstream, opposition to the Polish forces’ participation in the Iraq War mainly rested with parties on the fringes of the political spectrum: the far-right League of Polish Families (LPR) and far-left Self-Defense (Samooborona) [sic].

[18] Rekawek, Kacper; Renard, Thomas; Molas, Bàrbara (2024). Russia and the Far-Right: Insights from Ten European Countries (PDF). The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) Press. p. 316. ISBN 9789083419916. ISSN 2468-0486. doi:10.19165/2024.1563. Together with Mateusz Piskorski, a longtime stalwart of the pro-Russia scene in Poland, and a former parliamentarian with the far-left and populist Samoobrona (Self-Defence) party, they also ran the YouTube channel Die Guten Menschen! until 2021, the recordings of which were repeatedly shared by Dugin on his now-defunct Facebook fan page.

[19] Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser; Paul Taggart; Paulina Ochoa Espejo; Pierre Ostiguy (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Col: Oxford Handbooks. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press. p. 193. ISBN 9780192525376. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001. On the radical left, Poland’s Self Defence (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SRP) party exploited rising public discontent with the politics and politicians of transition to enter parliament as the third largest party in 2001.

[20] Eckhard Jesse; Tom Thieme (2011). Extremismus in den EU-Staaten (em alemão) 1 ed. [S.l.]: VS Verlag. p. 450. ISBN 978-3-531-17065-7. Zehn linksextremistische Parteien zogen von 1994 an ins Europaparlament ein, von denen die meisten – mit Ausnahme der polnischen Samoobrona – in ihren Wahlergebnissen relativ stabil blieben.

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